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REGULATING THE SHADOW BANKING SYSTEM IN CHINA 
 
By: Megan Lindgren 
 
 The Chinese financial system has grown significantly since the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC) began functioning as the central bank in 1983 and the Shanghai Stock Exchange was 
established in 1990.1 Total assets of banking institutions grew from 40 trillion yuan in 2006 to 
210 trillion yuan in 2016.2 Increasing financial sophistication in China is both a blessing and a 
curse. Commercial enterprises and investors welcome the wider array of financial products 
available today, but regulators face the challenge of maintaining financial stability in an 
increasingly complex market. Other actors, such as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
have been left out of the mainstream financial system and have turned to alternative funding 
sources such as shadow banking. 
 This paper aims to explore the development of the shadow banking system in China. 
Shadow banking is broadly defined as credit intermediation that occurs through activities and 
entities outside the regular financial system.3 Due to formal and informal constraints by the PBC 
on the amount and quality of lending in China, businesses without access to the four major state-
controlled commercial banks have resorted to shadow banking as a substitute source of credit. 
The Chinese shadow banking system is growing rapidly by overall size and proportion of global 
shadow banking activities. Based on the Financial Stability Board’s “narrow” measure of 
shadow banking, it currently accounts for $7 trillion of $45 trillion global shadow banking assets 
                                                        
1 People’s Bank of China, (last visited Apr. 30, 2018), http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130712/index.html; 
China’s Stockmarket Plunge: This Time It’s Different, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 2018, 
https://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21737077. 
2 People’s Bank of China, China Financial Stability Report 2017, July 2017, at 36. 
3 Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking, FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD OF NEW YORK ECONOMIC 
POLICY REVIEW, 2013, 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2013/0713adri.pdf.	
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and grows 29% annually.4 Shadow banking supports economic growth and investment by 
providing wider access to affordable credit. However, it also greatly increases risk in both the 
domestic and international financial systems. 
 This paper is organized as follows: Part I provides an overview of the types and size of 
shadow banking activities in China. Part II explains how shadow banking developed in China 
and identifies three major drivers: 1) demand for credit to support business investment and 
economic growth 2) lack of regulatory expertise and oversight and 3) restriction of credit after 
the global financial crisis in 2009. Part III explores the benefits of shadow banking as a source of 
needed credit, especially during China’s transition up the economic value chain. It also 
highlights the risks of shadow banking, including lack of transparency and barriers to systemic 
risk assessment, implicit government guarantees, and corruption and criminal penalties. Part IV 
offers policy proposals for legal and institutional reform and reduced government intervention in 
macroeconomic planning. Additionally, it includes a brief analysis of broader domestic and 
international pressures on the Chinese financial system.  
I. THE SCOPE OF SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA 
 
 A. Types of Shadow Banking in China 
 Shadow banking is a general term that encompasses a wide variety of bank and non-bank 
credit activity. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York defines shadow banking as credit 
intermediation outside the regular financial system without protection from either the central 
bank as a lender of last resort or public deposit insurance programs.5 In China particularly, credit 
                                                        
4 Financial Stability Board, Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report 2017, Mar. 5, 2018, at 3,  
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P050318-1.pdf. 
5 Pozsar, supra note 3. 
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intermediation can be classified into three categories based on the source of funds and 
cumulative distance from the original lender.6  
 First, the creditor stage includes wealth management products (WMPs) and trust 
products.7 WMPs issued by banks, trusts, and securities firms are investment products that 
provide a higher yield than traditional bank deposits based on performance of specific underlying 
assets.8 WMPs are usually purchased by wealthy individuals seeking target returns, although 
interbank WMPS are becoming more common.9 Trust products include trust loans, non-listed 
equity, and traded financial instruments purchased by both wealthy individuals and corporate and 
institutional investors.10  
 Second, the intermediate stage consists of financial system interlinkages including bank-
trust cooperation, bank-securities brokerage cooperation, and bank-to-bank trust beneficiary 
rights transfers.11 Bank-trust cooperation and bank-securities brokerage cooperation relationships 
are used to transfer money from WMPs to trust companies and investment products to securities 
brokerages, respectively.12 The purpose of transferring management and holding of assets from 
banks to trust companies through such vehicles is to remove loans from bank balance sheets. For 
example, trust beneficiary rights are derivative transactions in which the purchaser receives a 
proportion of trust returns in exchange for keeping assets off-book.13 Bank-to-bank trust 
beneficiary rights transfers shift loan and debt security exposures to other banks through a single-
                                                        
6 Torsten Ehlers et al., Mapping Shadow Banking in China: Structure and Dynamics, BANK FOR 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS WORKING PAPERS, Feb. 2018, at 9.  
7 Ehlers, supra note 6, at 35. 
8 Douglas Elliott and Yu Qiao, Reforming Shadow Banking in China, May 2015, at 3, 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Elliott-Shadow-Banking-2.pdf. 
9 Ehlers, supra note 6. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 36. 
12 Id. 
13 Elliott, supra note 8. 
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investor trust that then loans the money to the ultimate borrower.14 This technique shifts credit 
risk from one bank to another while avoiding or decreasing regulatory burdens.  
 Third, the ultimate borrower stage includes a range of forms of lending. Entrusted loans 
are loans between two corporations with a bank as an intermediate fiduciary to side-step bans on 
direct lending to corporates.15 Trust loans operate like traditional bank loans, with funding from 
bank-issued WMPs or wealthy individual and institutional investors.16 While trust companies are 
technically regulated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), they have rather 
flexible charters and are not subject to normal banking regulation.17 Peer-to-peer (P2P) lending 
matches saver-lenders and users-borrowers via online platforms.18 Other informal lending exists, 
such as loans by pawn shops or small businesses, but much of this activity is illegal.19  
 B. Size of the Shadow Banking Market in China 
 
 It is difficult to precisely calculate the size and growth rate of the shadow banking system 
in China. The market lacks transparency because a significant amount of credit intermediation 
occurs off balance sheets and goes unregulated.20 Therefore, statistical records from domestic 
regulators and international organizations are incomplete and likely underestimate the true 
amount of shadow banking activity in China. 
 The most current and reliable data is available through the Financial Stability Board 
(FSB). For the first time in 2017, the FSB was able to collect baseline data on China and include 
the country in its annual report on global shadow banking. The FSB estimates the Chinese 
                                                        
14 Ehlers, supra note 6, at 36. 
15 Id. at 37. 
16 Id. 
17 Elliott, supra note 8. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 People’s Bank of China, supra note 2, at 150. 
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shadow banking system at $7 trillion in 2016 based on its conservative “narrow” measure of 
shadow banking.21 The system accounts for approximately 16% of global shadow banking assets 
and 2% of total global financial assets.22 For comparison, the United States accounts for 31% of 
the global total and is thus twice the size of the Chinese shadow market.23 However, the 
mainstream banking sector in China is the largest in the world at $33 trillion and twice the size of 
the banking sector in the United States. 24 Therefore, while the absolute size of the Chinese 
shadow banking market is concerning, it is a smaller proportion of the country’s domestic 
financial system than shadow banking is in the United States.  
 The three stages of shadow banking vary in size. The creditor stage is approximately 77% 
of China’s GDP, the intermediate stage is 50%, and the borrower stage is 55% in 2016.25 The 
amount of shadow funds available from creditors is higher than shadow funds that borrowers 
ultimately receive because a significant portion of WMP funds are diverted into bonds, the 
interbank market, and “structured” intermediation that does not include direct lending to 
borrowers. A key trend is that WMPs are rapidly shifting from guaranteed instruments (8% of 
GDP) to non-guaranteed instruments (31% of GDP). While non-guaranteed instruments increase 
returns for investors, they also increase systemic risk in the broader financial system.26  
II. DEVELOPMENT OF SHADOW BANKING IN CHINA 
  
 Shadow banking has grown especially quickly in China over the past decade due to three 
interrelated factors: 
                                                        
21 Financial Stability Board, supra note 4, at 3. 
22 Id. 
23 Financial Stability Board, supra note 4, at 50. 
24 Gabriel Wildau, China Overtakes Eurozone as World’s Biggest Bank System, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Mar. 5, 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/14f929de-ffc5-11e6-96f8-3700c5664d30. 
25 Ehlers, supra note 6, at 28–30. 
26 Ehlers, supra note 6, at 28. 
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 First, the supply of credit is inadequate for the high level of demand from growth-seeking 
private and public entities. The Chinese financial system is dominated by four commercial 
banks—Bank of China, China Construction Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Industrial 
and Commercial Bank of China—which are partially state-owned and operate under supervision 
of Communist Party leaders.27 The PBC imposes informal lending quotas to direct both the level 
of credit growth and which sectors should receive funds.28 The commercial banks lend most of 
their deposits to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and local government-backed investment 
entities.29 Preferred lending practices restrict the supply of private credit and favor large 
commercial enterprises with established reputations who can access traditional forms of credit. 
While there is evidence that officials are relaxing enforcement of quotas as the PBC transitions 
towards a market-based interest rate regime, SMEs and other higher risk borrowers continue to 
face barriers.30  
 Strong and unmet demand for credit also comes from the public sector. Local 
governments are incentivized to invest in large infrastructure projects, such as building roads and 
factories, in order to meet central government growth targets. Historically, the central 
government did not permit local governments to issue bonds, eliminating a key source of credit 
for local economic development plans.31 A massive government stimulus plan in 2009 led to an 
overextension of credit to local governments, which quickly reversed as bank managers decided 
                                                        
27 Dan Awrey, Law and Finance in the Chinese Shadow Banking System, 48 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 23 
(2015). 
28 Id. at 28. 
29 Simin Gao, Seeing Gray in a Black-and-White Legal World: Financial Repression, Adaptive Efficiency, 
and Shadow Banking in China, 95 TEX. INT’L L.J. 95, 106 (2015). 
30 Zhou Xiaochuan, A Few Thoughts on Market-based Interest Rate Reform, THE PEOPLE'S BANK OF 
CHINA, Jan. 4, 2011, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/955/2011.html.  
31 Michael F. Martin, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42380, China’s Banking System: Issues for 
Congress 31 (2012). 
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to only offer credit to the most reliable SOEs instead.32 As a result, local governments turned to 
shadow banking and created local investment enterprises to channel the funds into projects. In 
2015, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) approved a local debt swap scheme through which 
provincial governments can sell low-interest bonds directly to commercial banks to replace high-
interest loans from the shadow banking sector.33 While this creates a mainstream credit channel 
for local governments, it is not a replacement for open local government bond markets and could 
create additional market distortions. 
 Second, a lack of regulatory expertise and oversight allows the shadow banking system to 
circumvent traditional barriers to credit activity and regulation. The key regulators of the banking 
sector are the PBC, MoF, and CBRC. However, no central government entity officially oversees 
shadow banking. Instead, non-professional regulators such as the Ministry of Commerce and 
local government-appointed departments are tasked with handling shadow banking issues day-to-
day.34 Decentralization of authority means that rules for financing guarantee companies vary by 
jurisdiction and there is no official reporting to any national regulatory authority. The regulatory 
gap increases the lack of transparency of shadow banking activity and provides local officials 
with opportunities for corruption. 
 Third, the global financial crisis in 2009 led to a contraction in mainstream credit and 
increased private demand for shadow banking. The most prominent example comes from the city 
of Wenzhou in Zhejiang province. Wenzhou grew rapidly beginning in the 1980s because of its 
concentration of entrepreneurs and high level of private sector development. Due to the global 
financial crisis in 2009, the Chinese government imposed tight restrictions on credit. Businesses 
                                                        
32 Martin, supra note 31, at 32. 
33 Elliot, supra note 8, at 5. 
34 Gao, supra note 29, at 129. 
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in Wenzhou turned to “underground banks” to fill the gap. Shadow banking offered an 
alternative to strict interest rate ceilings on deposit accounts, a result of tight monetary policy 
after the government’s crisis stimulus package, and allowed speculators to take advantage of 
rising real estate prices.35 Local officials allowed informal financing arrangements with almost 
no regulation or oversight.36 Excessive shadow lending led to the city’s financial collapse in 
2011-2012, when an estimated 80% of businessmen defaulted on debts, disappeared, or 
committed suicide.37 In response, the central government issued lending guidelines and 
developed bank stress tests, but the shadow banking market had already expanded in size and 
complexity.38  
III. BENEFITS AND RISKS OF SHADOW BANKING 
 
 Shadow banking offers many benefits to the Chinese financial system. It is an important 
source of credit for local governments, private enterprises of all sizes, and individual investors. 
Access to cheaper and more flexible credit arrangements encourages business investment and the 
efficient flow of money, which in turn drive economic growth. Shadow banking provides higher 
returns for savers limited by PBC control of deposit and lending interest rates.39 As China moves 
up the economic value chain, investors and borrowers will continue to seek a wider range of 
options and greater sophistication in financial markets. Innovation in shadow banking fills the 
gap until regulators and the Communist Party leadership permit greater flexibility in monetary 
policy and decrease restrictions on capital flows.  
                                                        
35 Martin, supra note 31, at 6. 
36 Gil Lan, Insights from China for the United States: Shadow Banking, Economic Development, and 
Financial Systems, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 144, 166 (2015). 
37 Wei Shen, Shadow Banking System in China – Origin, Uniqueness, and Governmental Responses, 1 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 20, 23 (2013). 
38 Martin, supra note 31, at 6. 
39 Gao, supra note 29, at 105. 
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 However, shadow banking creates significant risks. Shadow banking does not fall under 
the purview of mainstream systemic risk assessments and evades international risk management 
standards. For example, a key attraction of credit intermediation is that it allows entities to lessen 
or avoid onerous capital liquidity standards. China aggressively began implementation of the 
Basel III capital adequacy requirements in 2007 to comply with international regulatory 
standards.40 While the largest banks met Basel tests as early as 2013, many small and medium-
sized banks could not or would not comply.41 However, regulators instituted a ban on packaging 
off-balance sheet loans into WMPs in early 2018 to push banks into traditional lending and curb 
shadow lending.42 This should force banks to move assets back onto their balance sheets, 
increasing transparency and legitimizing government financial stability initiatives.   
 Despite such positive government efforts, two unique Chinese legal institutions continue 
to threaten financial stability and the rule of law. First, implicit government guarantees create a 
moral hazard problem. The central government has traditionally acted for decades as a lender of 
last resort for failing financial institutions. In the event of a bank failure, credit intermediaries 
assume that the central government will bail out every actor along the shadow banking lending 
chain, particularly if the funds originated at one of the large commercial banks.43 In 2015, China 
introduced a deposit insurance scheme as a step towards clarifying bank resolution procedures.44 
This signaled to the shadow banking system that the government would allow financial 
institutions to fail, decreasing the incentive to engage in risky informal lending. However, the 
deposit insurance system is in its early stages and remains largely untested. 
                                                        
40 Wei Liu, Basel III and Bank Regulation in China, 7 J. LEGAL TECH. RISK MGMT. 1, 9 (2014).  
41 Id. 
42 Gabriel Wildau, Chinese Banks Under Pressure from Beijing to Boost Capital, FINANCIAL TIMES, 
Apr. 24, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/cee23ffa-43aa-11e8-803a-295c97e6fd0b.    
43 Awrey, supra note 27, at 34. 
44 A.L., China Introduces Deposit Insurance, 34 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 12, 13 (2015). 
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 Second, the government imposes harsh criminal penalties for “economic crimes.” The 
judicial system has the discretion to impose long prison sentences and even the death penalty for 
underground credit activity.45 While the list of official economic crimes covers an array of 
activity and is part of the broader Communist Party fight against corruption, shadow banking 
prosecutions in particular may be motivated by more than punishing illegal activity.46 Gao 
suggests that the government uses harsh criminal punishment instead of administrative fines to 
deter private actors from competing with SOEs for deposits.47 Penalties for financial fraud and 
money-laundering are necessary, but capital punishment for widespread quasi-legal activity is 
excessive. Harsh criminal punishment incentivizes shadow banking actors to engage in even 
more opaque transactions, hindering regulatory efforts and financial reporting. Furthermore, 
foreign investors will demand a higher level of independence from the judicial system as the 
Chinese financial sector liberalizes, and disproportionate punishment may decrease judicial 
credibility on the international stage. 
IV. REFORMS AND POLICY SOLUTIONS  
 
 Shadow banking developed in China largely because of a lack of access to affordable 
credit and inadequate risk management systems. Therefore, mere bans on particular types of 
credit intermediation or harsh penalties will not be enough to mitigate risk from the shadow 
banking system. Regulators will need a comprehensive approach in order to permanently shift 
shadow lending to regulated mainstream instruments. China can achieve a more sustainable, 
flexible regulatory environment for its quickly maturing financial sector by instituting legal and 
                                                        
45 Gao, supra note 29, at 132. 
46 See Benjamin Kang Lim, China's CEFC Chairman Investigated for Suspected Economic Crimes, 
CNBC, Mar. 1, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/01/reuters-america-update-2-chinas-cefc-chairman-
investigated-for-suspected-economic-crimes--source.html. 
47 Gao, supra note 29, at 132. 
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institutional reforms, reducing government intervention in macroeconomic planning and 
monetary policy, and addressing broader domestic and international concerns. 
 A. Legal and Institutional Reforms 
 
 Recognizing the risks of unregulated credit intermediation, the Chinese government 
increasingly formalized its efforts in the past five years to enhance supervision of the shadow 
banking system. The State Council, the highest administrative body in China, published a report 
in 2013 identifying the agencies responsible for various supervisory tasks: the State Council, 
CBRC, China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
(CIRC), and the PBC.48 In order to increase transparency, the State Council directed the PBC to 
create a statistical framework for shadow banking and called for stronger commercial and 
individual credit rating systems.49 The report distinguished between credit intermediaries with 
and without financial licenses.50 It also recognized that some credit intermediaries are not subject 
to any supervision at all while others receive insufficient supervision or evade supervision.51 This 
demonstrates that the national government was aware of the range of shadow banking activity in 
China and intended to target regulatory efforts based on the scope and characteristics of 
particular types of credit intermediation. 
 However, regulatory objectives remain unclear and delegation of authority overlaps 
among the national agencies with supervisory responsibilities. President Xi Jinping’s recent 
efforts to centralize power and reorganize the government bureaucracy may provide needed 
                                                        
48 General Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, Notice of the General Office of 
the State Council on Issues Concerning Strengthening the Supervision of Shadow Banking, Doc. No. 107, 
Dec. 31, 2013.  
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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clarity.52 The reorganization includes significant changes to the structure of the financial 
regulators and explicitly addresses regulation of shadow banking. First, the government created a 
Financial Stability and Development Committee in July 2017 to coordinate high-level policy on 
financial stability and reforms of the financial sector.53 Second, the CBRC and CIRC will be 
merged into one commission in order to centralize risk management efforts, particularly for 
shadow banking.54 Third, the PBC will gain significant power beyond its current monetary 
policy authority because it will take over the previous CBRC and CIRC functions of drafting key 
regulations and prudential oversight.55 The ultimate effect of these changes on shadow banking 
activity remains to be seen, but they do signal increased government focus on actively managing 
systemic financial risk and curing deficiencies in the regulatory structure. 
 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) advocated for additional reforms in its 2017 
annual Financial Sector Stability Assessment for China. The report emphasized regulatory clarity 
and legal reform as key components of financial stability.56 The IMF Executive Board explained:  
[Analysts] stressed the importance of adequate legal protection, clear institutional 
mandates and accountability to ensure sufficient independence and resources for 
oversight agencies to act effectively and foster interagency cooperation…. Strengthening 
the financial safety net and the legal framework for bank resolution would improve 
incentives and reduce the potential risks to public resources that could arise from the 
failure of financial institutions.57  
                                                        
52 Chun Han Wong, China Unveils Overhaul of Government Bureaucracy, WALL STREET JOURNAL, 
Mar. 13, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-unveils-overhaul-of-government-bureaucracy-
1520905490. 
53 The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China Establishes Financial Stability and 
Development Committee, Nov. 9, 2017, http://english.gov.cn/news/top_news/2017/11/08/content_28147 
5936107760.htm. 
54 Jun Luo, China's Central Bank Gains More Power in Xi's Regulatory Shuffle, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 12, 
2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-13/china-announces-plan-to-merge-banking-
insurance-regulators. 
55 Id. 
56 See Financial Sector Stability Assessment: People’s Republic of China, INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND, IMF Country Report No. 17/358, Dec. 2017, at 8, 39, and 53. 
57 IMF Executive Board Concludes Financial Sector Stability Assessment with China, 
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, Press Release No. 17/469, Dec. 6, 2017, at 3. 
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To address shadow banking risk, the IMF recommended that the government improve legal and 
regulatory processes for bankruptcies of insolvent WMPs, eliminate implicit guarantees (which 
have no legal basis) and lending to particular sectors, and limit asset market interventions to high 
risk periods.58 These reforms would help shift the government’s focus from economic 
development objectives to financial stability and provide clear, predictable risk management 
procedures for credit intermediaries. They would not completely eliminate excessive risk in the 
shadow banking market, but they would likely shift funds into more transparent instruments and 
more quickly resolve failing credit intermediaries. 
 B. Government Intervention in Macroeconomic Planning and Monetary Policy 
  
 The legal and institutional reforms proposed above would be strengthened by economic 
reform. Decreased government intervention in macroeconomic planning would shift the 
government’s primary focus from achieving economic development goals to encouraging 
financial modernization and stability. Shadow banking expanded in part because of strict 
government restrictions on the amount and quality of credit in the banking system. Increasing the 
decision-making authority of financial institutions would allow them more flexibility to make 
efficient market decisions and diminish the incentive to turn to unregulated sources of credit. The 
CBRC has already shown a willingness to make some compromises on government control; for 
example, in early 2018 it eased rules on high loan-loss provisions to align more with 
international standards and encourage banks to engage in traditional forms of lending.59 
 Further interest rate and currency liberalization is also needed. Market-based interest 
rates and a more flexible exchange rate would help manage systemic risk by allowing the market 
                                                        
58 Financial Sector Stability Assessment, supra note 56, at 11. 
59 Gabriel Wildau, Beijing puts foot on accelerator for bank lending, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 7, 2018, 
https://www.ft.com/content/4cc6ee1c-21cc-11e8-9a70-08f715791301. 
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to correct imbalances on an on-going basis without waiting for government intervention. 
Additionally, interest rate reform would not only help established financial institutions but also 
individuals and SMEs. First, increasing or eliminating the interest rate cap on ordinary bank 
deposits would increase the incentive to save, because depositors would get a more reasonable 
rate of return.60 Second, lowering restrictions on the lending rate would increase the incentive to 
lend to SMEs. This would decrease the volume of shadow banking activity because it would 
solve the initial problem—lack of access to affordable credit. Third, reforms of usury laws would 
increase the availability of credit while protecting consumers from excessive exposure. As Gao 
explained, “Chinese law currently prevents all kinds of usury without having a clear definition of 
usury, and current judicial practice regards all interest rates that exceed four times the interest 
rate set by the People's Bank as illegal, even if the interest is reasonable and risky to an 
acceptable degree.”61 However, liberalization is likely to continue to be very gradual given the 
PBC’s generally cautious approach.62  
 C. Broader Domestic and International Concerns 
 
 Broader domestic and international pressures exist that exacerbate the risks of shadow 
banking in the Chinese financial system and contribute to global financial instability. A major 
domestic imbalance is the central government’s significant authority and control over provincial 
and local government oversight of financial institutions. While standardized rules are essential to 
ensuring consistent supervision and eliminating regulatory arbitrage, local officials engage in 
deals with local credit intermediaries and corruption to evade top-down control.  
                                                        
60 Gao, supra note 29, at 140. 
61 Id. at 141. 
62 See People’s Bank of China, supra note 2, at 30. 
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 A major international concern is China’s commitment to maintaining international risk 
management standards and opening its domestic financial sector. While the largest banks in 
China are generally compliant with Basel III standards, the IMF noted that higher and more 
tailored capital requirements may be needed in China to counterbalance volatility as its financial 
sector expands and modernizes.63 Additionally, the United States is concerned with government 
subsidies to Chinese banks, especially SOEs. The 2001 World Trade Organization accession 
agreement for China required the opening of domestic financial markets to foreign banks over a 
five-year period, but American banks complain that they still face barriers.64 While China 
recently announced it would raise foreign ownership limits for financial institutions from 49-
50% to majority 51% in 2018, analysts are skeptical of how much this will promote openness.65 
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK 
 
 The shadow banking system in China has significantly expanded in size and complexity 
over the past decade due to a lack of access to affordable credit, regulatory gaps, and government 
restrictions on lending. While credit intermediation fulfills high demand for funding, lack of 
transparency, implicit government guarantees, and corruption pose significant risks to financial 
stability. Further legal, institutional, and economic reforms are needed. Recent consolidation of 
power at the PBC and creation of the Financial Stability and Development Committee may 
promote regulatory clarity and financial stability. However, the success of these administrative 
changes remains indeterminate, and the Chinese government may face backlash from the 
international community if it does not promote financial liberalization and transparency. 
                                                        
63 Financial Sector Stability Assessment, supra note 56, at 41. 
64 Martin, supra note 31, at 12, 14. 
65 Kevin Yao, China pledges to allow more foreign investment in financial sector by year-end, 
REUTERS, Apr. 10, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-boao-pboc/china-pledges-to-allow-
more-foreign-investment-in-financial-sector-by-year-end-idUSKBN1HI074. 
